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A positive relationship between firm size and product diversification is a long-standing 
stylized fact. However, so far there is no appropriate theoretical model to explain the 
underlying forces of this observation. This paper analyzes an oligopoly model with 
asymmetric multiproduct frms, which is capable of addressing this issue. The model suggests 
that intangible assets of firms, which affect marginal costs or perceived quality of goods 
within a firm’s product line, play a key role for the empirical regularity that larger firms are 
more diversified. 
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Product diversi￿cation is a dominant feature of ￿r m si na d v a n c e dc o u n t r i e s . I n
particular, by using various indicators, empirical evidence for the manufacturing
sector strongly suggests that there is a positive relationship between the size of
￿rms/establishments and diversi￿cation, particularly regarding the number of prod-
ucts oﬀered (e.g., Amey, 1964; Utton, 1977; Gollop and Monahan, 1991).1 However,
so far there is no appropriate theoretical analysis in the literature to explain the
underlying forces of this important empirical regularity. In fact, due to the analyt-
ical complexity of oligopoly models with multiproduct ￿rms, existing multiproduct
models have focussed on the analysis of symmetric ￿rms.2 However, this modelling
strategy does not allow to address the observed relationship between product diver-
si￿cation and ￿rm size.
In contrast, this paper analyzes a simple multiproduct oligopoly model in which
￿rms are asymmetric with respect to their production technology and consumers￿
valuation of varieties within a ￿rm￿s product line. Firms produce diﬀerentiated
goods, facing linear demand, and are engaged in a two-stage decision process. At
stage 1, ￿rms choose the number of products oﬀered to the market. At stage 2, they
enter Cournot competition.3
The main contribution of the paper is twofold. First, it derives basic properties of
pro￿t functions of multiproduct ￿rms for the widely-used linear-demand model with
1For the U.S., Gollop and Monahan (1991, p. 327) conclude that ￿[q]uite clearly, large enter-
prises are more diversi￿ed than small ones￿. Moreover, their evidence suggests that a similarly
strong result also holds at the establishment-level. In a recent study on Taiwanese ￿rms, Aw and
Batra (1998, p. 313) suggest that ￿[t]he positive relation between ￿rm size and product diversi￿-
cation typically found in developed countries is limited to large exporting ￿rms￿.
2For a theoretical analysis of various aspects of multiproduct ￿rms, see, e.g., Raubitschek (1987),
Shaked and Sutton (1990), Anderson and de Palma (1992), Anderson et al. (1992, ch. 7), Sutton
(1998, ch. 2), and Ottaviano and Thisse (1999).
3For a similar modelling strategy, see, e.g., Raubitschek (1987), Sutton (1998), Ottaviano and
Thisse (1999).
2diﬀerentiated goods under Cournot competition, for given con￿gurations of both the
number of products and ￿rm-speci￿c characteristics (i.e., at stage 2 equilibrium).
Second, from these properties, the analysis provides for the ￿rst time a rigorous
theoretical explanation for the observation that size and product diversi￿cation of
a ￿rm are positively related. Both variables, ￿rm size, measured by total sales of a
￿rm, and its number of products are determined by ￿rm-speci￿c characteristics, i.e.,
by marginal costs and perceived quality of a ￿rm￿s products. Thus, comparative-
static analysis suggests that intangible assets of ￿rms, like basic organizational or
technological knowledge (aﬀecting marginal costs) as well as consumer loyalty or
trademarks (aﬀecting perceived quality of a ￿rm￿s products), play a key role for the
empirical regularity that larger ￿rms oﬀer more diversi￿ed product lines.4
As well-known, applicability of standard tools for comparative-static analysis is
very limited in the presence of strategic interactions of more than two players (e.g.,
Takayama, 1985; Dixit, 1986; Vives, 1999). However, focussing on the duopoly
case is not very satisfying, as extension to the case of many ￿rms adds complex
interactions which need to be addressed. Fortunately, the structure of the model
allows to apply a tool for comparative-statics in games with strategic substitutes
which has recently been developed by Athey and Schmutzler (2001). By doing so, it
is possible to derive a positive relationship between size and diversi￿cation for the
I−￿rm model. Moreover, contrary to the common practice of ignoring the integer
problem regarding the number of products, comparative-static results derived in this
paper do not hinge on the treatment of product ranges as continuous variables.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section
3 proves existence of a (pure-strategy) equilibrium and provides comparative-static
4Notably, in an informal way, Gorecki (1975) has already discussed the role of intangible assets
for diversi￿cation, pointing out that ￿￿ndings suggest that speci￿c assets of a technological nature
formed the basis of much diversi￿cation￿ (p. 134). For other motives of corporate diversi￿cation,
see, e.g., the literature review by Montgomery (1994). Aydemir and Schmutzler (2002) provide a
formal model in which mergers between big and small ￿rms are driven by the motive of big ￿rms
to expand their product space, among other reasons.
3results. Section 4 discusses the integer problem, allows for heterogeneity among
￿rms also with respect to diversi￿cation costs, and brie￿y addresses the empirical
regularity of an upward trend of corporate diversi￿cation in the last decades. More-
over, testable hypotheses emerging from the analysis are discussed in more detail.
Section 5 provides concluding remarks. Some proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
Consider a market for diﬀerentiated goods with a ￿nite set I = {1,...,I} of ￿rms,
indexed by i.L e tNi be the set of goods produced by ￿rm i, in (endogenous) number
Ni,a n dl e tK be the set of all varieties in the market. For the sake of tractability
(allowing for closed-form solutions) and its familiarity, the inverse demand function
for variety k ∈ K has the simple linear form




Ak > 0, β > γ > 0,w h e r epk and xk denote the price and quantity of product k,
respectively.5 Moreover, marginal production costs of each variety k are constant
and denoted by ck ≥ 0.L e t αk ≡ Ak − ck > 0, k ∈ K.T h e p a r a m e t e r αk
summarizes the relationship between perceived quality of variety k,r e ￿ected by Ak,
and unit production costs, ck. It is assumed that for all varieties oﬀered by the same
multiproduct ￿rm, this relationship is identical. Formally, this means the following.
A1. (Firm-speci￿c characteristics). αk = αi > 0 for all k ∈ Ni, i ∈ I.
Assumption A1 implies that there is a positive relationship between perceived
quality and unit production costs for all varieties supplied by a single ￿rm. Moreover,
5That is, there is a representative consumer with quasi-linear preferences which are re￿ected by












xkxl + Y ,w h e r eY is the quantity of the
numeriare commodity. As a caveat, however, the linear demand model is not capable to address
the notion that products oﬀered by a single ￿rm are closer substitutes for each other than for
products sold by diﬀerent ￿rms (Anderson and de Palma, 1992).
4￿rms are characterized by a single index αi. For instance, the view of consumers
regarding the quality of a ￿rm￿s products is aﬀected by the trademark associated
with a product line. Firms may also diﬀer in their organizational know-how or
their internal human capital stock, aﬀecting productivity and thus marginal costs.
In other words, ￿rms may diﬀer in their intangible assets,w h i c hi sr e ￿ected by
diﬀerences in αi in the model.6 Consequently, αi is called quality of intangible assets
of ￿rm i.T h e I−tuple α =( α1,α2,...,αI) is called a con￿guration of intangible
asset qualities.
There are two stages, with decisions at each stage made non-cooperatively and
simultaneously. At stage 1, ￿rms choose their number of products Ni (￿product
range￿). Let C :[ 1 , ﬂ N] → R+ be an increasing, twice continuously diﬀerentiable and
convex function, ﬂ N<∞. C(Ni) denote the costs of ￿rm i to introduce Ni ∈ [1, ﬂ N]
products in the market. (In section 4, choice sets at stage 1 are restricted to positive
integers {1,2,..., ﬂ N}.) For instance, these include costs for marketing or designing
products.7 The I−tuple N =( N1,N 2,...,NI) is called a con￿guration of product
ranges. At stage 2, ￿rms enter Cournot competition. This timing of events follows
some existing literature on multiproduct ￿rms (e.g., Raubitschek, 1987; Sutton,
1998; Ottaviano and Thisse, 1999). However, in contrast to this literature, the
present set up allows for asymmetry of ￿rms ex ante.
6The argument that a superior production technology or consumer loyality applies to any variety
a ￿rm oﬀers also ￿ts well into the common notion in the literature on multinational enterprises
that intangible assets are of public good nature from the perspective of a single ￿rm (see, e.g.,
Caves, 1971; Markusen, 2002).
7Assuming convexity of C(•) does not deny that there are economies of scope (or ￿subadditive
costs￿) in marketing, designing or manufacturing multiple products within a ￿rm (see, e.g., Baumol,
1977). However, one may think of increasing (Coasian) bureaucracy costs of product proliferation
as a counteracting force. In fact, all that is needed is that C(•) i sn o t￿ t o oc o n c a v e ￿i nt h er e l e v a n t
range. For instance, Anderson and de Palma (1992) and Ottaviano and Thisse (1999) consider
the special case of C(N)=gN, g>0, which is included in the present analysis. Also restricting
the choice set of ￿rms at stage 1 to the closed interval [1, ﬂ N], rather than to [1,∞) (relevant for
proving existence of equilibrium) serves a purely technical purpose, as ﬂ N can be arbitrarily large.
53 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, the equilibrium of the model is derived by backwards induction.
Moreover, it is examined whether there exists a systematic relationship between size
and product diversi￿cation of a ￿rm, and, if yes, what determines this relationship.
3.1 Cournot Competition (Stage 2)
First, consider the decision problem of ￿rms at stage 2, for a given con￿guration N.






(pk − ck)xk s.t. (1). (2)
Observing αi = Ak − ck for all k ∈ Ni, according to A1, the following ￿rst result is
obtained.
Proposition 1. (Equilibrium at stage 2). Under A1. In an interior Cournot-
Nash equilibrium at stage 2, each ￿rm i ∈ I produces output level ￿ xk ≡ ￿ xi for all








￿ πi = Ni(β − γ + γNi)Xi(N,α)
2 ≡ Πi(N,α), (4)










The analysis focusses on con￿gurations of intangible asset qualities, α,s u c ht h a t
Λi > 0,a n dt h u s ,￿ xi > 0 for all i.A c c o r d i n gt oP r o p o s i t i o n1, a multi-product ￿rm
i produces equal output levels for all varieties k ∈ Ni which it oﬀers. This is due to
the symmetry of varieties in demand schedules (1), together with assumption A1.
Moreover, output levels of single products (i.e., sales per variety) of ￿rm i, ￿ xi,a r e
6positively related to the intangible asset quality αi, for any given con￿guration of
product ranges N.
Apart from own αi, output levels and pro￿ts of a ￿rm i depend on other ￿rms￿
intangible asset qualities αj, j 6= i,a n do nc o n ￿guration N. The following corollaries
characterize pro￿t functions ￿ πi = Πi(N,α) in equilibrium at stage 2. In particu-
lar, these results will prove helpful for the comparative-static analysis of the next
subsection, in which the ￿rms￿ choice of product ranges (stage 1)i sc o n s i d e r e d .
Corollary 1. (Properties of stage 2 pro￿t functions). Consider the set of pro￿t
functions Πi :[ 1 , ﬂ N]I ￿ RI
+ → R+, i ∈ I.F o ra l li,j ∈ I, j 6= i,w eh a v e
(i) ∂Πi(N,α)/∂Ni > 0 and ∂2Πi(N,α)/∂N2
i < 0,
(ii) ∂Πi(N,α)/∂Nj < 0,
(iii) ∂Πi(N,α)/∂αi > 0 and ∂Πi(N,α)/∂αj < 0,
(iv) ∂2Πi(N,α)/∂Ni∂αi > 0 and ∂2Πi(N,α)/∂Ni∂αj < 0;
(v) if αi ≤ αj or if (αi − αj) suﬃciently small, then ∂2Πi(N,α)/∂Ni∂Nj < 0.
Proof. See appendix.
To gain insight into Corollary 1, it is helpful to decompose Πi(N,α) into the
product of total demand (or sales) of ￿rm i in equilibrium at stage 2, Di(N,α) ≡
NiXi(N,α), and its price-cost diﬀerence (￿mark-up￿), Mi(N,α) ≡ (β−γ+γNi)Xi(N,α).





























i,j ∈ I.T o t a ls a l e sDi of a ￿rm are used as measure of ￿rm size for the discussion
of results below. The properties of the functions Di(N,α) and Mi(N,α),w h i c ha r e
used in the following discussion of Corollary 1, are formally derived in an appendix
available from the author upon request.
First, according to part (i) of Corollary 1, the impact of an increase in product
range Ni on both equilibrium demand, Di, and on equilibrium mark-up, Mi,i s
7positive.8 Thus, ∂Πi/∂Ni > 0, according to (5) (for i = j), whenever varieties are
imperfect substitutes (i.e., β > γ).9 Moreover, strict concavity of pro￿ts at stage
2, Πi, as function of product range Ni means that a ￿rm￿s incentive to launch new
varieties is weaker, the more diversi￿ed the ￿rm is. Using (6) (for i = j)a n dt h e
de￿nitions of Di and Mi, one can show that the underlying reason for this result is
that the marginal gain of an increase in Ni regarding both Di and Mi is decreasing,
i.e., ∂2Di/∂N2
i < 0 and ∂2Mi/∂N2
i < 0.
Part (ii) of Corollary 1 means that a ￿rm￿s pro￿ts at stage 2, ￿ πi, decline if
any rival oﬀers additional products, which re￿ects a conventional ￿business-stealing
eﬀect￿. In fact, an increase in Nj reduces both Di and Mi of a ￿rm i 6= j.A l s o
unsurprisingly, part (iii) says that ￿ πi increases with its own intangible asset quality,
αi, but decreases with other ￿rms￿ intangible asset qualities, αj, j 6= i, holding the
con￿guration of product ranges N constant. Again, the eﬀects regarding both Di
and Mi go in the same direction.
According to part (iv), the pro￿t gain of ￿rm i from introducing additional
varieties increases with αi, but decreases with the strength of rivals αj, j 6= i,a l l
other things equal. It is easy to con￿rm that an increase in αi raises the impact of
an increase in product range Ni on both equilibrium demand Di and on equilibrium
8The latter eﬀect may be somewhat surprising at the ￿rst glance, but can easily understood
as follows. Note that (1), together with A1, implies that, in stage 2 equilibrium, pk − ck =
αi − (β − γ)￿ xi − γ ￿ Q ≡ Mi for all k ∈ Ni, i ∈ I,w h e r e ￿ Q ≡
P
l∈K
￿ xl is total equilibrium output in
the market in stage 2 equilibrium. On the one hand, it is easy to check that an increase in Ni
raises ￿ Q, all other things equal (see appendix). This has a negative eﬀect on Mi. On the other
hand, however, ￿rm i reduces equilibrium output per variety, ￿ xi,w h e ni n c r e a s i n gNi, which has a
positive eﬀect on Mi. The second eﬀect dominates the ￿rst one.
9Under the linear-demand structure (1), it is common to interpret the ratio β/γ as the degree
of substitution between goods. Note that for γ → β, i.e., if varieties are perfect substitutes, the











according to (3) and (4). Obviously, it does not pay for ￿rms to supply more than one variety in
this limit case. In contrast, with imperfect substitutes, i.e., if β > γ,i tm a yb eo p t i m a lf o r￿rms
to introduce more than one variety into the market, as will become apparent below.
8mark-up Mi (i.e., ∂2Di/∂Ni∂αi > 0 and ∂2Mi/∂Ni∂αi > 0), whereas an increase in
αj, j 6= i,h a st h eo p p o s i t ee ﬀect on ∂Di/∂Ni and ∂Mi/∂Ni, respectively.
As will become apparent below, the impact of an increase in a rival￿s product
range Nj on the incentive of a ￿rm i 6= j to launch new varieties (i.e., how ∂Πi/∂Ni
changes with Nj, j 6= i) is of particular importance for the subsequent analysis.
From the previous discussion of parts (i) and (ii), for j 6= i, one can conclude that
the second and third summand of the right-hand side of (6) are both negative.
However, one can also show that the ￿rst and last summand have ambiguous sign,
i.e., an increase in Nj may increase or decrease both eﬀects ∂Di/∂Ni and ∂Mi/∂Ni,
j 6= i. Part (v) of Corollary 1 says that the pro￿tg a i no fa￿rm i from increasing
product diversi￿cation is reduced by an increase in a rival￿s product range Nj, j 6= i,
if αi ≤ αj or if (αi − αj) is suﬃciently small, i.e., whenever ￿rms are not ￿too
heterogeneous￿ with respect to their quality of intangible assets. As will become
apparent, in this case, the optimal response at stage 1 to an increase in a rival￿s
product number is to decrease the own number of varieties, i.e., product ranges of
￿rms are strategic substitutes. The subsequent analysis exclusively focusses on this
case.
A2. (Strategic substitutes). For all i,j ∈ I, j 6= i,l e t∂2Πi(N,α)/∂Ni∂Nj < 0.
It can be shown that, for some con￿gurations N, assumption A2 holds for all
con￿gurations α, i.e., even if ￿rms are very heterogeneous. (See Remark 1 in ap-
pendix for a suﬃcient condition.)
Proposition 1 also implies the following useful result.
Corollary 2. (Exchangeability). Under A1. Let (￿ N, ￿ α) be a permutation of
(N,α) so that, for any pair i,j ∈ I, j 6= i, ( ￿ Ni, ￿ αi)=( Nj,αj), ( ￿ Nj, ￿ αj)=( Ni,αi)
and ( ￿ Nh, ￿ αh)=( Nh,αh) for all h ∈ I\{i,j}. Then, we have Πi(￿ N, ￿ α)=Πj(N,α)
and Πh(￿ N, ￿ α)=Πh(N,α) for all h ∈ I\{i,j}.
Corollary 2 is directly implied by the fact that pro￿ts at stage 2 are exclusively
9determined by con￿gurations N and α. Thus, exchanging both intangible asset qual-
ities and product ranges of two ￿rms also leads to an exchange of these ￿rms￿ pro￿ts
at stage 2, without aﬀecting other ￿rms￿ pro￿ts. Following Athey and Schmutzler
(2001) (AS hereafter), we say that pro￿t functions Πi are ￿exchangeable￿ as func-
tions of (N,α). Exchangeability also plays a crucial role for the comparative-statics
of the I−player case below.
3.2 Firms￿ Choice of Number of Products (Stage 1)
By analyzing the ￿rms￿ choice of number of products (stage 1), this subsection
characterizes the equilibrium con￿guration of product ranges, denoted N∗,g i v e n
the con￿guration of intangible asset qualities, α.




Ψi(N,α) ≡ Πi(N,α) − C(Ni). (7)
Strategic interactions of ￿rms at stage 1 are represented by the game
'
([1, ﬂ N],Ψi),i ∈ I
“
.
Concavity of stage 2 pro￿ts, Πi,a sf u n c t i o no fNi (part (i) of Corollary 1)e n s u r e s
existence of equilibrium.
Proposition 2. (Existence of equilibrium). Under A1. For any given α ∈ RI
+,
a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game
'
([1, ﬂ N],Ψi),i ∈ I
“
) exists. Thus, a
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game exists.
Proof. See appendix.
Let N∗
i (α) be an equilibrium product range oﬀered by ￿rm i ∈ I. Without loss
of generality (as ﬂ N can be arbitrarily large), the analysis focusses on N∗
i < ﬂ N for
all i. Using (7), an equilibrium con￿guration of product ranges N∗ =( N∗
1,...,N∗
I)






i ),i ∈ I, (8)
with strict equality if N∗
i > 1.
103.2.1 The Duopoly Case
We are now ready to address the question how diﬀerences in equilibrium product
ranges, N∗
i ,a m o n g￿rms (i.e., equilibrium diversi￿cation) depend on diﬀerences in
intangible asset qualities, αi. First, consider the duopoly case, I =2 .
Proposition 3. (Product range in duopoly). Under A1 and A2. If I = {1,2}
and the equilibrium is unique, then αi > αj implies N∗
i (α) >N ∗
j (α).
As will become apparent below, Proposition 3 is a special case of Proposition 4.
Therefore, no formal proof of the two-player case is provided. Rather, the result is
illustrated graphically in Fig. 1. Note from (8) and strict concavity of Ψi(N,α) as
function of Ni that reaction functions are downward sloping under A2, i.e., N1 and
N2 are strategic substitutes. Uniqueness of equilibrium requires that the reaction
function of ￿rm 1 is steeper than that of ￿rm 2.10 According to part (iv) of Corollary
1, an increase in, say, α1 shifts the reaction function of ￿rm 1 rightward and that of
￿rm 2 downward, as shown in Fig. 1. That is, the marginal gain of ￿rm 1 to extend
its product range increases and the marginal gain of ￿rm 2 decreases.
<Please insert Figure 1 about here>
Fig. 1 depicts two kinds of a unique equilibrium (observing restriction Ni ≥ 1,
i ∈ I). In panel (a), the equilibrium is interior, whereas N∗
2 =1in panel (b). In
panel (a), an increase in α1 leads to an increase in N∗
1 and a decrease in N∗
2.11 In
10Note that any unique equilibrium is also ￿stable￿ if reaction functions are interpreted as de-
scribing dynamic behavior with alternate-period decisions. Using (8), it is easy to check that the
reaction function of ￿rm 1 is stepper than that of ￿rm 2 if




ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ + C00(N1)




ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ + C00(N2)
¶
>
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
∂2Π1(N,α)
∂N1∂N2
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
∂2Π1(N,α)
∂N1∂N2
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ.
11In contrast, if the reaction function of ￿rm 2 in N1 − N2 space is steeper than that of ￿rm
1 (implying multiple equilibria), it is easy to check that for an interior equilibrium the opposite
holds. See below for more discussion on the uniqueness requirement.
11(a)
(b)
Figure 1: The impact of an increase in  1 α  on  *
1 N  and  *



















•panel (b), only N∗
1 increases.12
3.2.2 The Case I>2
In view of the duopoly case, it seems intuitive that ￿rms with higher intangible asset
qualities have more diversi￿ed product lines. However, as it is well-known from
oligopoly theory, in general, comparative-static analysis of asymmetric equilibria
with more than two players can be very messy and may require strong assumptions
(e.g., Takayama, 1985; Dixit, 1986; Vives, 1999). To see the economic reason for this
in the present context, consider, again, an increase in α1. Recall that, in response to
an increase in α1, ￿rm 1 has an incentive to increase N1 and ￿rm 2 has an incentive
to decrease N2. On the one hand, if product ranges are strategic substitutes, an
actual rise in N1 would have a negative impact on the marginal gain of a ￿rm 3 (or
higher) of increasing its product range. However, an actual decrease of N2 would
have the opposite eﬀect on the behavior of ￿rm 3. A priori, it is not clear which
eﬀect dominates. In fact, an analogous argument holds for ￿rm 2 as well. If ￿rm
3 decreases N3 in response to an increase in α1, ￿rm 2 has an incentive to increase
N2. This even leaves the behavioral response of ￿rm 1 ambiguous. Due to these
complexities, generalization of the comparative-static results from the duopoly case
to the case I>2 is not straightforward.
Moreover, multiplicity of equilibria may create problems for comparative-static
analysis. To ensure uniqueness of equilibrium, one could invoke standard ￿dominant-



















ﬂ ﬂ for all i ∈ I, (9)
would be suﬃcient. However, (9) may be a strong assumption if the number of
players is high. Rather, following AS, it is assumed that the set of equilibrium
strategies at stage 1 satis￿es ￿conditional uniqueness￿. Formally, this means the
following.
12Qualitatively, a decrease in α2 has the same eﬀects as an increase in α1.
12A3. (Conditional uniqueness). For each i,j ∈ I and each α ∈ RI
+, if there exist
two equilibrium con￿gurations of product ranges N∗(α) and N∗∗(α) which ful￿ll
N∗
h(α)=N∗∗
h (α) for all h ∈ I\{i,j},t h e nN∗
i (α)=N∗∗
i (α) and N∗
j (α)=N∗∗
j (α).
For I =2 , conditional uniqueness reduces to uniqueness of equilibrium. How-
ever, if I>2, the requirement of conditional uniqueness is considerably weaker.






















ﬂ for all i,j ∈ I,j6= i. (10)
In the present context, condition (10 )i saf a i r l yw e a kr e q u i r e m e n t ,a sc a nb es e e n
from the expressions for ∂2Πi(N,α)/∂N2
i and ∂2Πi(N,α)/∂Ni∂Nj, j 6= i,i na p p e n -
dix.
We are now ready to analyze comparative-statics for the I−player case. The
next result is derived by applying a recent tool for comparative-static analysis of
games with strategic substitutes, due to AS.
Proposition 4. (Product range in I−player case). Under A1-A3. For all
i,j ∈ I,i f αi > αj then N∗
i (α) >N ∗
j (α).
Proof. Let N−i denote (N1,...,Ni−1,N i+1,...,N I) and write N =( Ni,N−i).
Now consider the following de￿nition.
De￿nition 1. (E.g., Vives, 1999). Ψi(Ni,N−i,α) has (strictly) increasing dif-
ferences in (Ni,αj) if, for all Ni >N 0
i, Ψi(Ni,N−i,α)−Ψi(N0
i,N−i,α) is (strictly)
increasing in αj, i,j ∈ I; (strictly) decreasing diﬀerences are de￿ned replacing ￿in-
creasing￿ by ￿decreasing￿.
If Ψi(N,α) is smooth and ∂2Ψi(N,α)/∂Ni∂αj > 0,t h e nΨi(N,α) has strictly
increasing diﬀerences in (Ni,αj). (See, e.g., Vives, 1999). As a next step, note that
the following holds.
Lemma 1. (Athey and Schmutzler, 2001). Let Ni ∈ Si be a one-dimensional
choice variable for player i ∈ I. Suppose the set of equilibria of the game {(Si,Ψi),i ∈ I}
13is non-empty and ful￿lls conditional uniqueness. Suppose further that (i) the play-
ers￿ choices are strategic substitutes, (ii) Ψi(N,α) is exchangeable in (N,α),a n d
(iii) for all i,j ∈ I, j 6= i, Ψi(N,α) has increasing diﬀerences in (Ni,αi) and
decreasing diﬀerences in (Ni,αj).L e tN∗ be an equilibrium con￿guration. Then
αi > αj implies N∗
i (α) ≥ N∗
j (α).
In the present context, an equilibrium exists, according to Proposition 2, and
the set of equilibria ful￿lls conditional uniqueness by assumption A3. It is now
argued that conditions (i)-(iii) of Lemma 1 hold. Recalling Ψi(N,α)=Πi(N,α) −
C(Ni), condition (i) holds by A2. Condition (ii) of Lemma 1 follows from Corollary
2, applying the same de￿nition of ￿exchangeability￿ as in AS. Finally, note that
∂2Ψi(N,α)/∂Ni∂αi > 0 and ∂2Ψi(N,α)/∂Ni∂αj < 0, j 6= i, according to part (iv)
of Corollary 1. Thus, also condition (iii) of Lemma 1 is ful￿lled. Hence, αi > αj
implies N∗
i (α) ≥ N∗
j (α), according to Lemma 1.
However, in order to prove that αi > αj indeed implies N∗
i (α) >N ∗
j (α) (i.e.,
￿rm i has a strictly larger product range than ￿rm j), Lemma 1 has to be mod-
i￿ed slightly. In fact, the following can be deducted from the analysis of AS in a
straightforward way.
Lemma 2. Presume the same as in Lemma 1. Suppose further that Ψi(N,α) is
smooth and for all i,j ∈ I, j 6= i, ∂2Ψi(N,α)/∂Ni∂αi > 0 and ∂2Ψi(N,α)/∂Ni∂αj <
0.T h e nαi > αj implies N∗
i (α) >N ∗
j (α).
As Ψi(N,α) are smooth and, as argued above, also all other presumptions of
Lemma 2 hold, Proposition 4 is con￿rmed.
According to Proposition 4, the comparative-statics from the duopoly case carry
over to the case I>2. This is rather surprising in view of the complex additional
interactions among ￿rms (as outlined above) when there are more than two ￿rms.
One reason is that ￿rms are symmetric in the sense that, ex ante, ￿rms can be
characterized by their intangible asset quality, αi, only (recall the exchangeability
property in Corollary 2). For instance, it does not matter for ￿rm 3 (and higher) if
14￿rm 1 has α1 and ￿rm 2 has α2 or if ￿rm 1 has α2 and ￿rm 2 has α1.A sa r g u e db yA S
(p. 10), such a situation allows ￿to hold ￿xed the behavior of players 3 and higher
and focus on a two-player game￿. The preceding analysis has used this argument
to examine the behavior of asymmetric multiproduct ￿rms in the linear-demand
Cournot model regarding the choice of the number of products.
3.3 Firm Size and Diversi￿cation
We are now ready to derive the relationship between ￿rm size and equilibrium diver-
si￿cation. Equilibrium ￿rm size is measured by total sales of a ￿rm in equilibrium,
i.e., by equilibrium demand D∗
i(α) ≡ Di(N∗,α), i ∈ I. By making use of Proposi-
tion 4, one can show the following.





As a corollary of Propositions 4 and 5, the following theorem emerges.
Theorem 1. (Firm size and diversi￿cation). Under A1-A3. Firm size, measured
by total equilibrium sales, and product diversi￿cation are positively related. The
underlying determinant of both variables is the quality of intangible assets of a ￿rm.
Testable hypotheses implied by Theorem 1 as well as some modi￿cations of the
analysis are discussed in the next section.
4 Discussion
4.1 Testable Hypotheses
According to the preceding analysis, heterogeneity of ￿rms in marginal production
costs or perceived quality of goods within product lines account for diﬀerences of
15￿rms in both total sales (i.e., ￿rm size) and product diversi￿cation. This suggests
that intangible assets of ￿rms are a key to understand the long-standing stylized
fact of a positive size-diversi￿cation relationship (Theorem 1).
Interestingly, as far as diﬀerences in marginal production costs among ￿rms are
concerned, empirical evidence is also consistent with Proposition 5. For instance,
Roberts and Supina (2000) report a negative correlation between ￿rm size and mar-
ginal costs among U.S. manufacturing ￿rms. Moreover, using micro-level data from
the ￿Longitudinal Research Database￿ (developed by the U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus), Baily et al. (1992) ￿nd that the size of U.S. manufacturing ￿r m si sp o s i t i v e l y
related to total factor productivity (see their Tab. 8 and 9). However, whereas
in this literature productivity is the dependent variable in regression analysis, the
theory developed in this paper suggests that productivity jointly determines both
size and diversi￿cation.13
Moreover, the analysis suggests that consumer loyalty, which may be determined
a n dt h u sp r o x i e db yp a s ta d v e r t i s i n ge ﬀort, is not only related to sales of a ￿rm
but also to its product diversi￿cation. However, as pointed out by Gorecki (1975,
footnote 16), one has to distinguish between advertising on brand names of single
products and advertising which, in addition, refers to the name (or trademark) of an
enterprise (as, e.g., in the automobile industry). Only the latter kind of advertising
aﬀects consumers￿ views on other products supplied by a ￿rm, and thus, is related
to consumers￿ valuation of a ￿rms￿ trademark.
4.2 The Integer Problem
Existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium (Proposition 2) is ensured by the continuous
choice sets at stage 1, [1, ﬂ N]. Obviously, however, the common practice in the theo-
retical literature on multiproduct ￿rms of treating the Ni￿s as continuous variables is
13In fact, Baily et al. (1992, p. 223) carefully point out that their results should not be inter-
preted as causal eﬀects but rather re￿ect correlations. See Bartelsman and Doms (2000) for an
excellent survey of the empirical literature on productivity diﬀerences among ￿rms.
16problematic. Fortunately, in the present context, comparative-static analysis is also
possible when choice sets at stage 1 are restricted to positive integers {1,2,..., ﬂ N}.
(That is, diﬀerentiability of pro￿ts Ψi(N,α) is not required.) However, there is an
important caveat. Although every ￿nite normal form game has at least one Nash
equilibrium, existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium may not be guaranteed in the
present context. If it exists, the following can be stated.
Proposition 6. (Integer choice sets). Under A1-A3. Let strategy sets of ￿rms at
stage 1 be given by Si ≡ {1,2,..., ﬂ N}, i ∈ I. Suppose that a pure-strategy equilibrium
for the game {(Si,Ψi),i ∈ I} exists. Then, αi > αj implies both N∗




j(α). Thus, if anything, larger ￿rms are more diversi￿ed.
Proof. Note that De￿nition 1 and Lemma 1 (see the proof of Proposition 4)
do not rely on diﬀerentiability of Ψi(N,α), i ∈ I.T h u s , t h e r e s u l t t h a t αi > αj
implies N∗
i (α) ≥ N∗
j (α) directly follows from Lemma 1, as it has already been
established that all presumptions of Lemma 1 hold. Moreover, using N∗
i ≥ N∗
j ,t h e
result that αi > αj implies D∗
i(α) >D ∗
j(α) can directly be deducted from the proof
of Proposition 5. This concludes the proof.
With choice sets at stage 1 being restricted to positive integers, it is now possible
that N∗
i = N∗
j if αi > αj. Moreover, note that even in this case total sales of ￿rm i
are strictly larger than those of ￿rm j, i.e., D∗
i >D ∗
j if αi > αj.
4.3 Heterogeneity in Diversi￿cation Costs
In the preceding analysis, the sunk cost schedule at stage 1, C(•), for introducing
products in the market is identical among ￿rms. This is a strong assumption. For
instance, ￿rms with higher perceived product quality may have lower marketing costs
to introduce new varieties in the market, e.g., if their trademark is well recognized.
Moreover, ￿rms with low marginal production costs may be more eﬃcient also in
introducing additional products to the market, i.e., in marginal costs of designing
or marketing. In order to capture these possibilities, replace C(Ni) by K(Ni,αi),
17assuming that ∂2K(Ni,αi)/∂Ni∂αi ≤ 0. In this case, Proposition 4 remains valid,
as implied by its proof. (Thus, both Proposition 5 and Theorem 1 still hold.) The
same is true even if ∂2K(Ni,αi)/∂Ni∂αi > 0,a sl o n ga s∂2Πi(N,α)/∂Ni∂αi ≥
∂2K(Ni,αi)/∂Ni∂αi.
4.4 Increasing Average Diversi￿cation
The main focus in this paper is the role of intangible assets for explaining cross-
section evidence regarding the relationship between ￿rm size and product diversi-
￿cation. This subsection brie￿y discusses another empirical regularity, namely a
steady upward trend in product diversi￿cation of ￿rms in the last decades. For
instance, Goto (1981) presents evidence from large Japanese ￿rms in various indus-
tries between 1963 and 1975 which suggests that ￿rms became considerably more
diversi￿ed with respect to their commodities over time. Gollop and Monahan (1991)
analyze data from manufacturing ￿rms for ￿ve points in time in the period between
1963 and 1982, concluding that ￿[d]iversi￿cation has replaced horizontal growth￿
(p. 318). In more recent times, the emergence of computer-aided design (CAD)
has reduced costs of product design and development. Moreover, computer-aided
manufacturing (CAM) has reduced production costs. As argued by Milgrom and
Roberts (1990), these developments have increased the ￿rms￿ incentives to extend
product lines.
It is straightforward to capture these trends in the present context. As asymme-
try of ￿rms is not crucial for these arguments, for simplicity, suppose αi =￿ α for all
i ∈ I.D e ￿ne the I−tuple ￿ α ≡ (￿ α,..., ￿ α) and let N∗
i (￿ α) ≡ ￿ N∗ ∈ (1, ﬂ N), i ∈ I.A l s o
de￿ne the I−tuple ￿ N∗ ≡ ( ￿ N∗,..., ￿ N∗).
Let us start with a decrease in marginal production costs (e.g., due to the emer-
gence of CAM), implying an increase in ￿ α. According to (8), if ￿ N∗ > 1 (which is
presumed here), the equilibrium product range, ￿ N∗,i sg i v e nb y∂Πi(￿ N∗, ￿ α)/∂Ni =




I∂2Πi(￿ N∗, ￿ α)/∂Ni∂￿ α




∂2Πi(￿ N∗, ￿ α)/∂Ni∂Nj − C00( ￿ N∗)
. (11)
Using parts (i) and (iv) of Corollary 1, and observing both A2 and C00(•) ≥ 0,
∂ ￿ N∗/∂￿ α > 0 is implied. That is, if intangible asset qualities improve, then product
ranges of ￿rms increase. In an analogous way, a downward shift in the marginal
sunk cost schedule C0 (e.g., due to the emergence of CAD) leads to an increase in
￿ N∗.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper has analyzed an oligopoly model with asymmetric multiproduct ￿rms,
which is consistent with the long-standing empirical regularity that larger ￿rms
oﬀer more diversi￿ed product lines. The analysis suggests that heterogeneity of
enterprises with respect to intangible assets is a driving force behind a positive re-
lationship between ￿rm size, measured by total sales, and product diversi￿cation.
This result has been derived for the familiar speci￿cation of linear demand sched-
ules and diﬀerentiated goods under Cournot competition (under weak additional
assumptions), by applying a recently developed tool for comparative-static analysis
of games with strategic substitutes.
Admittedly, the focus of the present analysis on the number of products as mea-
sure of product diversi￿cation is quite narrow. For instance, Gollop and Monahan
(1991) construct a diversi￿cation index which, in addition to the number of prod-
ucts supplied by an enterprise, also accounts for the distribution of sales from these
products within a ￿rm and diﬀerences in the heterogeneity of products. Applying
this index to a large data set of U.S. manufacturing ￿rms and establishments, they
￿nd that ￿[t]he number component is the dominant force￿ in explaining corporate
diversi￿cation (p. 327). This gives some justi￿cation for focussing the theoreti-
cal analysis on the number of products, exogenously ￿x i n gt h ed e g r e eo fp r o d u c t
19diﬀerentiation, and thus, leading to a uniform sales distribution within a ￿rm.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: First, note that πi =
P
k∈Ni(pk − ck)xk implies
∂πi
∂xk






where ∂pl/∂xl = −β and ∂pl/∂xk = −γ for l 6= k, according to demand structure
(1). Thus, optimal behavior of ￿rm i ∈ I at stage 2 is given by the following set of





l∈Ni\{k} xl =0 , k ∈ Ni,w h e r eαi = Ak − ck for all k ∈ Ni has been used
(assumption A1). Adding and subtracting 2γxk implies
αi − 2(β − γ)xk − γQ − γ
X
l∈Ni
xl =0 , (A.2)
where Q ≡
P
l∈K xl is total output in the market. Thus, xk = xi for all k ∈ Ni,
which implies
P





Note that Q =
P
i Nixi. Multiplying both sides of (A.3) by Ni and summing over all
i ∈ I, one obtains the total output level ￿ Q =
P
i Ni￿ xi in Cournot-Nash equilibrium,
given by







where Γi = γNi/[2(β − γ)+γNi]. (A.4) implies






where Λi is de￿ned in Proposition 1. Using (A.3) and (A.5) yields (3).14
14Also note from (A.5), and the de￿nitions of both Λi and Γi,t h a t ￿ Q is decreasing in Ni, i ∈ I,
as claimed in footnote 8.
20To obtain (4), ￿rst, note that pk−ck = αi−(β−γ)xk−γQ for all k ∈ Ni,a c c o r d i n g
to (1)a n dαi = Ak−ck.S i n c e￿ xk =￿ xi for all k ∈ Ni, (A.3) then implies equilibrium
price-cost diﬀerences (or mark up￿s, respectively) ￿ pk − ck =( β − γ + γNi)￿ xi ≡ Mi
for all k ∈ Ni. Finally, noting that ￿ πi = Ni￿ xiMi con￿r m s( 4 ) .T h i sc o n c l u d e st h e
proof. ⁄
Proof of Corollary 1: First, let us write
P
h∈I Γh =1+Φ−i + Γi,w h e r e
Φ−i ≡
P
h6=i Γh.T h u s ,u s i n gΓi = γNi/[2(β − γ)+γNi],w eh a v e
￿ xi =
Λi
(1 + Φ−i)(2(β − γ)+γNi)+γNi
, (A.6)
according to (3). By substituting (A.6) into (4), we obtain
￿ πi =
Ni(β − γ + γNi)Λ2
i
[(1 + Φ−i)(2(β − γ)+γNi)+γNi]
2. (A.7)




(β − γ)[2(β − γ + γNi)+( 2 ( β − γ)+3 γNi)Φ−i]Λ2
i
[(1 + Φ−i)(2(β − γ)+γNi)+γNi]








[(1 + Φ−i)(2(β − γ)+γNi)+γNi]
4 ￿ (A.9)
£









−4γ(β − γ)Ni (β − γ + γNi)(2(β − γ)+γNi)ΛiΛj
[2(β − γ)+γNj]
2 [(1 + Φ−i)(2(β − γ)+γNi)+γNi]






[(1 + Φ−i)(2(β − γ)+γNi)+γNi]
4 [2(β − γ)+γNj]
2 ￿ (A.11)
{(αi − αj)[2(β − γ + γNi)+( 2 ( β − γ)+3 γNi)Φ−i] ￿
[2(β − γ + γNi)+( 2 ( β − γ)+γNi)Φ−i] −
Λi [(2(β − γ)+γNi)(2(β − γ)+3 γNi)Φ−i +4 ( β − γ)(β − γ + γNi)]},
21respectively. (A.8) and (A.9) con￿rm part (i) of Corollary 1 and (A.10) con￿rms
part (ii), respectively (recall that Λi,Λj > 0 in interior equilibrium). Moreover,









j6=i αjΓj). Thus, (A.7) and (A.8) also con￿rm parts (iii) and
(iv), respectively. Part (v) follows from (A.11). This concludes the proof. ⁄
Remark 1. Full derivations of (A.8)-(A.11) can be found in supplementary
material to this paper, which is available from the author upon request. There, it
i sa l s os h o w nt h a ti no r d e rt oo b t a i n∂2￿ πi/∂Ni∂Nj > 0, j 6= i, it is necessary that
both αi > αj and Φ−i > 2(β − γ)/[2(β − γ)+γNi] simultaneously hold. Thus, as
claimed in the main text, even if ￿rms are very heterogenous, assumption A2 may
still be ful￿lled. Φ−i ≤ 2(β −γ)/[2(β − γ)+γNi] is a suﬃcient condition for A2 to
hold for all con￿gurations α.
Proof of Proposition 2: Existence of equilibrium is proven by applying the
following classical existence result.
Lemma A.1. (Debreu, 1952). Let Si ⊆ Rm denote the the set of feasible
strategies of player i ∈ I, with a typical element si. Moreover, let Ui : ￿iSi → R
be the payoﬀ function of player i. If, for all i ∈ I, Si is non-empty, compact and
convex and Ui is continuous in (s1,s 2,...,sI) as well as quasiconcave in si,t h eg a m e
{(Si,U i),i ∈ I} possesses a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
First, note that strategy sets [1, ﬂ N] for the ￿rms￿ choice at stage 1 (i.e., in max-
imization problem (7)), are nonempty, compact and convex subsets of R.S e c -
ond, note that objective functions of ￿rms in (7), Ψi(N,α), are continuous in
(N1,N 2,...,NI). Third, according to part (i) of Corollary 1 and the convexity of
C(•), Ψi(N,α)=Πi(N,α) − C(Ni) is strictly concave in Ni (and, thus, quasi-
concave in Ni). Applying Lemma A.1, this proves existence of a Nash equilibrium
for the ￿rms￿ decision of product ranges. Existence of equilibrium for the entire
two-stage game is directly implied. ⁄
22Proof of Proposition 5: De￿ne Γ∗

































a c c o r d i n gt o( 3 ) .H e n c e ,w eh a v eD∗
i(α) >D ∗













Recall from Proposition 4 that N∗
i >N ∗
j if αi > αj.T h u s ,u s i n g( A . 14), Proposition
5i sc o n ￿rmed if, for instance, αi > αj implies Λ∗
i > Λ∗
j. To see that this is indeed
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j if αi > αj. This concludes the proof. ⁄
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